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Table 6 Basic Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences Regression Analyses of Texas Reforms

From: The net effects of medical malpractice tort reform on health insurance losses: the Texas experience

  New Jersey Colorado 41 State Subsample 18 State Subsample 9 State Subsample
DDD Estimator 0.6191** 0.2000 0.1505 −0.0424 0.0821
[0.270] [0.305] [0.245] [0.253] [0.271]
Treatment Dummy 0.3992*** 0.2950*** 0.3064*** 0.3221*** 0.2984***
[0.038] [0.039] [0.037] [0.037] [0.038]
Control Dummy 1.2416*** 1.5457*** 1.5698*** 1.6944*** 1.6363***
[0.231] [0.280] [0.113] [0.143] [0.174]
Control*Treatment −0.2435 −0.5476 −0.5717** −0.6964*** −0.6382**
[0.320] [0.342] [0.236] [0.246] [0.264]
Reform Dummy −0.0138 −0.0741*** −0.0509*** −0.0494*** −0.0527***
[0.016] [0.012] [0.005] [0.006] [0.008]
Treatment*Reform −0.1916*** −0.1312*** −0.1544*** −0.1560*** −0.1527***
[0.041] [0.039] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037]
Control*Reform 0.0827 0.5019** 0.5513*** 0.7442*** 0.6198***
[0.138] [0.208] [0.091] [0.114] [0.150]
Constant 0.2608*** 0.3650*** 0.3536*** 0.3379*** 0.3616***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.005] [0.006] [0.008]
Observations 2447 2873 42,436 21,281 11,603
R-squared 0.2338 0.3113 0.3469 0.4252 0.3794
  1. Notes: This table presents the results of several difference-in-differences-in-differences analyses obtained using the regressions described generally in eq. 2. The dependent variable, Losses per Enrollee (LPE), is defined as the dollar amount of health insurance losses incurred by a given insurer, in a given state, during a given year, scaled by the number of plan enrollees for a given insurer, in a given state, during a given year. LPE is also scaled by 1000. “DDD estimator” is the difference-in-differences-in-differences estimator, “Treatment dummy” indicates firms operating in Texas, “Reform Dummy” indicates years following the enactment of the Texas reform measures, “Control dummy” indicates health insurers, “Control*Treatment” is the interaction of Control dummy and Treatment dummy, “Treatment*Reform” is the interaction of Treatment dummy and Reform dummy, and “Control*Reform” is the interaction of Control dummy and Reform dummy. Each column of output represents a separate analysis that differs only by the subsample of firms used as non-treated groups. Clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses and ***indicates p < 0.01, **indicates p < 0.05, and *indicates p < 0.1